THE RULES OF THE GAME OF WAR
6. The Conduct of WarThis war game -- like war itself and like all forms of strategic thought and action -- tends to demand the simultaneous consideration of contradictory requirements.
Each side, in so far as it has managed to preserve its freedom of manoeuvre, is obliged to choose between operations for the undertaking of which the means available are bound to be wanting, in some respect or another, in terms of space and time.
In spatial terms, neither side, so long as the initial balance of forces has not been upset, ever has enough troops either to protect itself at every point where protection is called for, or to attack and nourish its offensives wherever it might wish, or even to respond adequately where the enemy has forced its hand. In terms of time, an army's movements are never as rapid as one would wish: less than a third of the forces available at the outset may be moved in one turn (a consideration corresponding to the "friction" that slows down all movement in real warfare: the time for orders to be transmitted, the inevitable delays in their execution, etc.). A choice must often be made between an early arrival with few troops, or a later one with more, at the place where an engagement will occur. Urgent necessities such as the moving up of reinforcements or the repositioning of communications units are imposed for tactical reasons as soon as an engagement is initiated, for, though the maximum number of units must be thrown into battle, at the same time these units have to be guaranteed the best possible support against the enemy's next move, while units left isolated following earlier enemy action may need to be pulled back.
Each army must strive to keep the initiative, compensating for shortfalls in troop strength by the speed with which it can concentrate its forces at a decisive point where it must be the stronger: strategic manoeuvres succeed only when victory yields an immediate return, so to speak, in terms of tactical confrontation. Defensive play is stronger per se, both tactically and strategically, but only offensive -- or at least counter-offensive -- moves can achieve positive successes.
Forces on the defensive cannot remain static, save temporarily on some highly local position. Rather, they must develop the means of counter-attack. Offensive operations, as they evolve, always tend towards a climactic point, as when superior forces are encountered which compel reversion to the defensive, or when an enemy counter-movement begins to threaten a line of communication stretched thin. Such a counter-movement may itself be countered, either by direct defensive action on the part of friendly units barring access to the vulnerable line of communication or by an indirect defence threatening the flank of the counter-attacking forces. The limits to such combinations are set by lack of the forces and the time required to execute specific movements.
It is naturally highly desirable to extend one's front and threaten the enemy's flanks and rear, yet at the same time the concentration of troops for battle is of the utmost necessity. The enemy's defeat in a major battle is the most direct route to victory in the whole campaign, because the likely upshot is that the enemy will lose its entire army or at least be put at an irreversible numerical disadvantage. When a concentrated army interposes itself between two separated enemy forces, the likely outcome is that one of those forces will be destroyed without the other being able to come to its aid; and an army that is still unified but overextended along a narrow line is liable to breakthrough, which leads to the same prospect.
It makes sense to move against the enemy's communications, but one's own will be stretched in the process, and their protection must also be considered. If such a movement is entrusted to a detached force it must possess enough offensive and defensive strength to oblige the enemy to commit a substantial portion of its forces to engaging it. But over-reinforcement of such a detached force will dangerously diminish the capacity for tactical resistance of the main body, which is the pivot of manoeuvre. Since any detached force should exist as such for the shortest time possible, and since as a strategic threat speed is its most effective asset, it will normally be made up of mounted units. Such rapid units, however, are also the shock troops which the main body of an army cannot completely do without in battle (assuming that the enemy's are still intact). Mounted troops, moreover, though strong in attack, are weak in defence if engaged by the enemy and cornered without benefit of infantry support; sending infantry along with them, however, will slow them down. This problem is aggravated by the fact that the armies in the field are both very small -- as small, in fact, as is compatible with the flexibility needed by fighting forces for manoeuvre and battle. It is this small size of the armies, dwarfed by a vast territory, which justifies the use of the detached forces that in such circumstances can achieve decisive successes. The risks are great, however, for neither army can engage in battle under favourable conditions if it cannot count on the combined support of its three arms.
Similarly, when two completely grouped armies are engaged in tactical confrontation, it is advantageous to manoeuvre on one of an enemy's flanks in order either to close on their line of communication or to bring concentrated fire to bear on one wing of their forces by means of an enveloping movement. Unfortunately, this may also serve as a cue for the enemy to effect the very same movement on the other wing, for flanking movements inevitably expose one's own opposite flank: the flanker will be flanked.
That portion of an army which, after being bettered in a local engagement, finds itself too weak -- or on the point of becoming too weak -- to launch further counter-attacks, will retreat with a view to concentrating its forces; or else it may withdraw in the direction of reinforcements, or towards a stronger position -- crossing a pass, for example, or seeking the protection of a fort. The victorious army, meanwhile, will pursue the defeated portion of the enemy forces so as to maximise the losses that it is bound to continue inflicting upon them until they recover. Still, the victors can move only five units per turn, so that pursuing forces that remain in contact or within range of the retreating army must beware of prolonging engagement beyond the culminating point after which they will be at risk of counter-attack from an enemy that has now regained superiority in terms of concentration and seeks to regain the initiative at the earliest possible moment. There is thus a correct moment for abandoning the tactical exploitation of a successful engagement and proceeding immediately to its strategic exploitation -- to operations, say, against enemy arsenals or lines of communication, taking advantage of the situation that has been created by the opponent's retreat and new numerical inferiority (since enemy losses have necessarily exceeded one's own ever since the tide of battle turned against the adversary).
In this war game, the number of obviously ill-advised dispositions of forces and manoeuvres is very great; yet even among moves that may be considered well chosen, none, so long at least as a reasonable balance of forces and positions still exists, is assured of success. Success or failure will depend in every case on the action (or inaction) of the adversary. Some measure of carelessness is bound to be a factor on either side, while the most elaborate plans remain largely subordinate to the changes wrought by a succession of unpredictable responses from the opponent, and by the reactions they in turn evoke, all more or less finely judged -- and, most importantly, all more or less successfully executed. The interaction between tactics and strategy is a continual source of surprises and reverses -- and this often right up until the last moment. Though the basic principles are certain, their application is always a matter of doubt.
This is a war of movement, albeit one arrested at times on a static front, as in the case of the defence of a mountain pass or fort. A war in which territory per se is of no interest: the sole concern is with the tactical or strategic positions that are necessary to an army or deleterious to its adversary. On occasion victory may be achieved without a major battle, even almost without skirmishes, on the basis of manoeuvre alone. Sometimes, too, everything may be decided by a single frontal clash without any manoeuvring at all. These extreme cases aside, however, the typical chain of events involves a series of movements, engagements, a major battle, renewed manoeuvring, and so on. Within the main battle, manoeuvre almost always takes the forms of envelopment, retreat, and actions against enemy communications. It behoves an army not to be too sparing of troops or movement, nor yet to squander them. A player who would keep all will lose all. But players who blithely allow themselves to lose more than their opponent will not be able to contain that opponent.
